April 7, 1999

Clinton's Policy Bombs

Can you bomb someone into acting reasonably?

Bill Clinton and his deep thinkers were betting that they could -- or, at least, that's what they told us they were doing. As of this writing, it appears that over two hundred thousand Kosovars are dead or displaced, at the hands of the rapacious Serb forces of Slobodan Milosevic, due partly to this miscalculation. The heart of the Clinton policy on Kosovo, while perhaps well-intentioned, was empty -- or, worse, negligently self-deluded. The premise was that a US-led NATO bombing campaign would compel Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet uneasy peace accord with Kosovo, a province of Serbia that was, two weeks ago, 90 percent ethnic Albanians. But even if such pressure brought Milosevic's signature to a piece of paper, the conflict would not be resolved. Many, if not most, Kosovars desire independence (a goal not supported by Washington); the brutal Serbian regime wants to keep an iron grip on the resources-rich and culturally significant region. And after the barbarity and bombing of the first week of war, one could not expect either Kosovo and Serbia to abide by a pact that recognizes Kosovo as part of Serbia and that places NATO in the role of a supposedly neutral peacekeeper. The logic of the policy was dubious: the bombs were dropped in support of an agreement that would make no sense once the bombs were dropped.

Bombing, as the Kosovars have painfully learned, is often not persuasive. In Vietnam, the tons of munitions dropped from US airplanes did not convince Hanoi to yield. The air campaign conducted against Saddam Hussein has not transformed him into a good neighbor. Bombs should not used to send a message or to prove credibility -- that is, to make good on the threat to bomb. Bombing may be useful as part of larger war-making strategy, but the US and NATO insisted that this was not war (more on that in a moment) and that selective bombing, in and of itself, would produce a positive outcome. "Bombing is not a preventive tool," says Julianne Smith, a senior analyst for the British American Security Information Council. "It is a consequence of not having any preventive tools. It's clear that the NATO bombings are not saving lives. Instead they are contributing to the escalation of the conflict."

Hindsight is a columnist's handmaiden. It's easy to say now that the mess that ensued following the first sorties demonstrates the weaknesses of the Clinton policy. Nevertheless, the assumptions under which he proceeded were thin. The man who stood by and did nothing while hundreds of thousands were killed in Rwanda chose Kosovo as the conflict warranting military action. Why not the Sudan or Sierra Leone, where the number of victims were greater? Or Turkey, where a US ally has massacred Kurds? The unevenness in US policy did not bode well. Before pulling the trigger, Clinton declared that one purpose of the assault was to deter a more brutal Serbian offensive against the Kosovars. What was the basis for that conclusion, other than wishful thinking? It appears Milosevic and his marauders were prepared with a kill-them-or-clear-them-out plan to be put into action once the bombing began. Yet Clinton was confident a bombing campaign would be sufficient to stop Milosevic in his evil ways.

The urge to stop the Serb's offenses in Kosovo was admirable. But by yielding to the we-gotta-bomb-in-order-to-do-something impulse, Clinton and the allies helped turn an ugly situation to a damn nightmare. The larger failure, though, had occurred long before the bombing order was transmitted, for the Clinton Administration and the world community had followed a course that left them with few options. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had squawked for months that Milosevic would get his if he didn't sign on the dotted line. That placed the United States and its allies in the position where they had to bomb to show they could stick to their fighting words. And that provided Milosevic the free-for-all cover he needed for implementing his final solution for Kosovo.

It didn't have to be this way -- possibly. Part of the problem was the absence of a coherent, long-term policy. Two years ago, the Conflict Prevention Network, an outfit connected to the European Union, produced a confidential report that began, "With no solution to its constitutional status, the Kosovo problem remains the most intense conflict in the South Balkans and could become violent any time soon, starting with clashes between Albanians and Serbs and spreading into neighboring countries, perhaps even dragging in EU and NATO member states." Peering ahead wisely, the report proposed a host of programs that aimed at clearing the brush that could catch fire: aid and economic development for the region, money for human rights and democracy programs, the establishment of a special EU envoy, support for independent media and bilingual language programs, a US advisory council for the region, and assistance to nongovernmental organizations in the area. Who knows if any of this would have worked? But none of it was tried. That's the shame. "The argument you get from policymakers on why they do not implement these forward-looking ideas," says Julianne Smith, "is that they are too busy putting out the fires of today. When do we make the switch and start heeding warnings so we don't have so many fires and we are stuck only with the option of eleventh hour military intervention. The US and NATO are using a gun to put out a fire. When it doesn't work, they reach for a bigger gun."

The Clinton policy is full of contradictions. Washington resorted to bombing to protect a group it neglected for years, and more Kosovars went homeless. Without declaring war -- or being authorized by Congress to wage war, as the Constitution dictates -- the Clinton gang pummeled Serbia. Then when three U.S. servicemen were captured, Washington hollered that Serbia damn better follow the Geneva Convention. At the State Department briefing room, department spokesman James Rubin declared, "We're not in a state of war." Try convincing the Serbs of that. "If we're not at a state of war," asked a journalist, how would you describe the state?" Without letting a beat pass, Rubin replied: "I don't have a legal definition....The facts are quite clear to everybody." Even if Milosevic warrants attacking, this is still another illegal Clinton war. That is not a matter that troubles members of Congress, which conveniently was in recess last week. "Most of the guys here are glad to be out of town," said a Senate aide on Friday, "and relieved to not have to talk about Kosovo."

Conservative critics who have slapped Clinton for not going all-out have a half of a point. If the dire situation in Kosovo deserves US intervention, then the intervention ought not to be half-assed. As a general rule, bombing alone does not win wars or resolve conflicts. It may be that the US and NATO have a secret agenda: to initiate a war that will lead to Yugoslavia's -- and Milosevic's -- dismemberment. But if that is the case, Clinton has an obligation to speak forthrightly about it. By last Thursday, Kosovars were proclaiming that NATO had let them down. "When we signed the Rambouillet agreement [in February], we were led to believe that NATO and the US will help Albanians [in Kosovo]," Shkem Dragobia, a Kosovo Liberation Army soldier, told a correspondent for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting. "So we stopped arming and mobilizing ourselves." Apparently, Dragobia did not understand that Clinton, as is typical, had made but a partial commitment. The President was taking the cheap way out: bombing. So the policy is, Kosovo is worth a bombing campaign, but not a declaration of war and all that entails, including ground troops. A more extensive effort, one that reaches beyond bombing, may not produce success. Clinton would have to obtain a declaration of war from Congress, send in 100,000 to 200,000 troops, force out the Serbs, and then occupy Kosovo for an indefinite period. But, at least, it would reflect an internally consistent policy and not confuse poor Shkem Dragobia. Is Kosovo worth a war? That is a question on which Clinton owes the American public and the Kosovars an honest answer.

A Cuban Frost

On the first days of the bombings, I was in Havana, the ground zero of another misguided foreign policy of the Clinton Administration. Having been fortunate enough to snag an assignment to cover the baseball game between the Baltimore Orioles and a Cuban all-stars team -- the first time a major league team has played in Cuba in 40 years -- I was running about the city, enjoying mojitos and fine music. During the week before the baseball game, several dozen US pop musicians -- Bonnie Raitt, Joan Osborne, David and Don Was, Mick Fleetwood, Burt Bacharach, Michael Franti, Montell Jordan -- were in town, as part of a musical exchange, to write, record and perform with Cuban artists. Throughout Havana, news camera crews chased after the US celebrities, including actor Woody Harrelson, who was inexplicably part of the musician delegation. At the patio bar of the luxurious Hotel Nacional, the famous offered soundbites on US-Cuban relations. Bacharach told Bravo that cultural exchanges of this sort will make it "easier for us to all get together. Music should be shared." Raitt told a band of Cuban journalists, it was "good to be here while Cuba is still not so under the influence of the West." And Harrelson, swiping at American moral superiority, told a Fox News reporter, "You think you're a free person? Try driving without a seat belt. Or try driving a motorcycle without a helmet. Try smoking a joint. There's oppression here, no doubt it exists, but why do we keep idealizing what we have?" At the end of the week -- hours after the Os defeated the Cubans in a well-fought, extra-innings game, 3 to 2 -- Cuban and American musicians gathered at the Karl Marx Theater for the climactic concert.

There was not much overt politics to the show. The most explicit song was performed by Raitt, Harrelson, Pablo Menendelez, and Ray Guerra: "Cuba Is Way Too Cool." The lyrics poked fun at the United States, portraying it as a bully in its relationship with this island nation. "Big bad wolf, you look the fool....If you're so mighty, tell me, where's the threat?" Raitt crooned. It's hard to argue that Washington, with its absurd 37-year-old travel and commercial embargo, has not been heavy-handed in dealing with Cuba. (The US government tells its citizens that they are free to travel to China but not to Cuba.) And before an audience that included a bronzed George Hamilton -- don't ask me why he was there -- rapper Franti proclaimed, "This week with the baseball game and the concert -- this signifies a new time. This is a time when things really began to change."

But in Cuba, life has gotten less cool for free thinkers, and the recent changes in internal policies have not been positive. Should I have been surprised that the American musicians I spoke with backstage were unaware that the island was in the middle of a severe government clampdown? The artists were in Cuba to make music, not to assess the political scene. Nevertheless, it was difficult to applaud for a song hailing Cuba's coolness after having visited a Cuban writer named Luis.

But first, as they say on network news shows, some background. Two weeks before the ball game, four dissidents were sentenced to prison for having published a critique of the 1997 Cuban Communist Party platform. Scores of activists were detained prior to the behind-closed-doors trial. (Canada, Cuba's largest investor, protested the verdicts vigorously, as did the European Union.) In the first two months of this year, at least 17 independent journalists were arrested. In Havana these days, police are everywhere. They have cleared out what once was an extensive prostitution trade. But they also are sending a signal: we are watching. Cars are routinely pulled over, papers and passengers checked. And in February the government passed a harsh anti-sedition law that severely punishes Cubans involved in disseminating "subversive" information. (The law was approved shortly after the Clinton Administration angered the Castro regime by announcing minor measures to increase contact between Cubans and Americans while maintaining the embargo.)

Luis was upset about the anti-sedition law. He can no longer work with foreign journalists, as he has in the past. He has lost much of his income. Were he to act as a translator or consultant for an overseas newspaper and this paper ran a story that a government bureaucrat deemed harmful to the revolution, Luis could be imprisoned for two decades. "The new law came as a surprise," he said. "After the Pope visited in early 1998, dissidents could meet in people's homes. Sometimes a security officer would visit and warn them not to overstep. And in December, the government approved Christmas as a paid holiday. That was a sign of tolerance. The new law ends all of this." Why the new round of repression? "Since the collapse of the Soviet Union," Luis explained. "The government has been forced to open some areas of the economy and that gives independence to part of the population. The worst nightmare of Fidel Castro is to lose power. And Castro was mad about the latest Clinton steps. He sees no relaxation, just the United States trying to stimulate subversion and get people to behave against the government."

Luis yearns for American periodicals and books, which the US government does not permit to be sold in Cuba. A family member craves a copy of the film Dr. Strangelove, which she has never seen and which is not shown in Cuba. Luis spoke of a Cuban who went to America and wanted to buy a computer printer he could not acquire officially in Cuba. The US government, citing the embargo, would not permit this Cuban to bring the printer back to Cuba. It is madness that Washington makes the plight of people like Luis harder. If Americans could travel to Cuba, if US firms could sell goods to Cuba -- including books, films, music, and magazines -- those who do not back Castro's status quo would be reinforced. "The US embargo should be lifted," said Luis, who supported the ban until the fall of the Soviet Union. "The embargo and US policy are the bogeymen that are used to justify the inefficiencies and incapacities of the Cuban government to deliver. It gives Castro the excuse for what he does." Castro -- who, to be fair, does preside over a developing nation with less visible poverty than many Latin America nations -- justifies his repressive practices by pointing to threat from across the Florida straits. I'd like to see him try to rationalize the oppression without that threat. So would Luis, who is squeezed by two governments, neither of which are way too cool.